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This paper presents an alternative view, an indigenized interpretation, of moderniza-
tion and modernity from the perspective of the historical experience of Korea.
Modernization is conceived as a twin process; first of international acculturation ema-
nating from the initial modernization of the West around the turn of the 16th century;
and second, of indigenous adaptive change in each society exposed to it; the former as
the converging force and the latter as the divergent process. The nature of the dynamics
of indigenous adaptation in each late modernizer society is explained by the Principles
of Political and Cultural Selectivity which provide ideas about the interactions among
different social forces and selective processes of the existing culture. The end result of
this politico-cultural response to the global modernization originating in the West is
conceived to be modernity of each non-western modernizing society. Modernity in this
sense is a mixture of traditional elements, colonial legacies if relevant, and indigenous
effort to adapt to the changing situation, and hence in some respect similar to, and yet
in other respects different from Western modernity. The issue of rationality and ratio-
nalization, the central theme of Western modernity, is discussed in the context of
Korean experience and prospect of change. Finally, some theoretical implications of
Yin-Yang dialectics are touched upon for future reflections on the idea of challenge and
response in global transformations.
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tive change
The primary purpose of this paper is to present an alternative view of the
phenomena of modernization and modernity from the perspective of the
historical experience of Korean society. It is to be an alternative to the cur-
rently predominant views of modernization and modernity originated in
the Western intellectual circles and largely accepted by the non — Western
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academic communities. To illustrate this view, the case of Korea is examined
briefly.
The need for alternative discourses in or indigenization of social science
from the purviews of non-Western societies has been a subject of serious
discussion for some time now and efforts to produce academic works in this
line have been made in earnest in certain parts of Asia over the last decade
or so. Such pursuits are aimed at overcoming Orientalist mentality and
eventually developing culturally independent social and historical science
in opposition to what is understood as the mainstream, Euro — American
social and historical science.1
Considering the importance of indigenization and alternative discourses
in social science, a paper of this nature would not be able to do justice to the
purpose if any decent yet detailed review is desired. And it should perhaps
suffice to state the main objective of this particular work in terms of its spe-
cific character that it does provide a different view of the subject matter of
modernization and modernity conceived and interpreted on the basis of the
unique experience of, say, Korean society, or for that matter any other late
modernizer societies around the world. In fact, according to this new theory
of modernization, the whole enterprise of indigenization of social science in
itself constitutes a form of modernity created by the process of moderniza-
tion in the so-called Third World outside the West. 
In the first part of this work, I am presenting a synopsis of my alternative
theory of modernization without referring to all the existing theories. This
will be followed by the second section which provides a concise overview of
the historical experience of modernization in Korea from the perspective of
my own theory of modernization. And finally, I shall discuss the implica-
tions of such an effort in view of the future development of human, social,
and historical sciences in East Asia and elsewhere outside the West.
AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF MODERNIZATION 
The Concept of Modernization and Modernity
To begin with the meaning of the terms, modernization and modernity, I
would stress the point that the term “modern” itself needs to be accepted as
an invention of European culture and the grand transformation of civiliza-
tional scale known as “modernization” is to be understood as an historical
process emerged in Western Europe around the turn of the 16th century and
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the Arab world, and Kim Kyong-Dong (1996) for Korean sociology. 
spread throughout the entire globe ever since. In other words, no matter
how the word might have been adopted, translated, and/or used in cultures
outside Europe and North America in a later point of time, when the term
“modern” was originally selected to denote the broad socio-cultural
changes experienced by the early modernizer societies of Western Europe
specifically as “modernization,” it already took a life of its own not to be
altered or reinterpreted by any other cultures. 
In fact, as for the practice of “periodization” of historical eras, up until
when the West decided to demarcate the specific period beginning around
the turn of the 16th century as ‘modern’, differentiating it from the previous
times marked as medieval and ancient, there had been no society in the
world which used this approach to distinguish historical periods. In most
societies, histories had been written in terms of the reign of rulers or dynas-
ties. The special demarcation by differential cultural eras, such as modern,
medieval, and ancient, therefore, was a cultural invention of the Western
intellectual history. 
In short, modernization as conceived by the intellectuals of the early mod-
ernizing European societies deserves to be recognized as a unique cultural
phenomenon of those societies in human history. This holds despite the
argument that modernization of the West happens to be combined conse-
quences of certain accidental historical conditions and changes uniquely
manifested and taken place in Europe over the centuries, leading to the
commencement of transformations we know as modernization today.
Modernization of Europe in those days indeed took on very special features
quite distinguishable from other eras or other cultures of the world (Chirot,
1994; Goldstone, 2000). 
One such special characteristic of modernization initiated in Europe those
days was that the changes involved came to move beyond the geographical
boundaries of Europe and gradually spread out all over the world. One may
call this an “expansionist” tendency of modernization. In many of previous
civilizations, such expansionist tendencies were also manifested. However,
they were mostly in the form of military conquest and occupation which
was terminated after a certain limited span of time. This time, however, the
expansion was much more comprehensive and lasting. Modernization has
been outreaching spatially all over the globe, culturally covering all the
major aspects of human civilization, and temporally still continuing its
impact even today. One may attribute this expansionist tendency to the
modern capitalist economic system which emerged in modern Europe. No
matter, this all-embracing expansion of its own elements to other parts of
the world surely is a unique feature of modernization. 
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The cultural complex created by this process of modernization, then, has
been identified as “modernity.” The most essential ingredients usually listed
in the package of modernity so conceived would be such typical items as
Enlightenment, rationality or rationalization, secularization, the modern
state, liberal democracy, modern science and technological innovations cul-
minating in industrialization and information society, modern rational capi-
talism and its offshoots of whatsoever form, such as division of labor and
specialization, Fordism, and the like, the emergence of class and social
mobility, psychological mobility, open personality, social-cultural pluralism,
and the like, to mention only a few. One could go further in detail and pro-
vide a much longer list of elements of modernity. What is important is an
image of socio-cultural characteristics represented in this concept of moder-
nity, which seem to differentiate the West from the rest of the world (Chirot,
1986; Harrison, 1988; So, 1990; Giddens et al., 1994; Hall et al., 1996). 
The Alternative View from the Other Side of History
Granted that such are the conventional meanings of the terms under con-
sideration, we may now take an approach from the other side of history of
modernization, the side of those societies that came under the influence of
modernization originating in the West. The contrast here is between the ini-
tiators and followers, early starters and latecomers or late joiners, the
providers and recipients, and so on. It is recognized that modernization was
a Western invention and that if any other societies had begun changes on
their own quite similar in nature and scope to those evidenced in the history
of modernization started in the West, still nobody would have called it
specifically “modernization.” Then, a natural question would be what did
really happen to those non-Western latecomer societies. 
The first thing to be noted is that modernization started a world wide
process of “international acculturation” due to its expansionist tendency.
When the modern western cultures began to spread out to other parts of the
world, they came into contact with other cultures affecting them one way or
another. Acculturation means changes in cultures that come into contact
with other cultures. One notable feature of modernization as a form of
international acculturation, however, is that it has been generally “tilted,”
skewed, one-sided, or asymmetric.2
The modernizing West was in a position to impose its own cultures upon
those which came into contact with it. This asymmetry was primarily creat-
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ed by the relative power of the Western societies with respect to their eco-
nomic resources, military prowess, technological know-how based on scien-
tific development, and other resources in comparison with those other soci-
eties they came into contact. To be noted in this conjunction is that the com-
parison is not with respect to the relative values of cultures or civilizations
of these non-Western societies. It is specifically in terms of certain types of
resources, material or non-material. These other societies, therefore, were
now placed in the position of having to receive, whether they liked it or not,
the incoming western cultures. It is in this context that we now introduce
the idea of “adaptive change” and subsequent effort to “indigenize” mod-
ernization. 
The non-western receiving societies had to decide how they were to meet
this challenge of skewed international acculturation imposed by the incom-
ing western powers. They had to make some adaptive change on their own
no matter how a weaker position they were in with respect to the imposing
western forces. And one could naturally expect to find a great deal of varia-
tions in the way each latecomer society adapts to the global tide of modern-
ization. The end result always is some form of indigenization of the process
of modernization, and the outcome of this indigenization leaves a unique
mode of modernity in each society thus modernized. 
To summarize, modernization consists of twin processes of international
acculturation and adaptive change, transformations initiated by the West
around the turn of the 16th century and subsequently spread throughout the
world but eventually indigenized by each receiving society (Kim, 1985).
Now, in order to help better understand the dynamics of such twin process-
es from the perspective of the latecomer societies, I shall propose a few prin-
ciples of social-political-cultural dynamics involving the mode, conditions,
and consequences of responses attempted by the receiving societies. 
The Principle of Political Selectivity
Probably, the initial response to meet the challenge of adaptation to the
changing international situation would have to come from the political sec-
tor. Those in power or in the position to make major decisions that may
affect the fate of the nation would have to make up their mind as to the fol-
lowing issues:
1) whether or not they should open the door to the outside world to meet
the surge of acculturation almost imposed upon them by the external forces;
2) if so, how they would meet the challenge; or if not, what would be the
options;
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3) when imposed or coerced to open the door and accept the incoming
cultures (as was the case with all the nations and societies that came into
contact with the West in the process of global modernization), they should
determine (a) how much of (b) what elements of those cultures are to be
accepted (c) in what sequence (d) at what pace and possibly (e) to the bene-
fit of which section(s), element(s), or strata of the society. 
The whole process of adaptive change entails what I call “political selec-
tivity.” Consciously or not, this selective response is inevitably made. At this
juncture, however, one should take note of the internal political dynamics of
the society in respect with the selective response. This has to do with the
nature of the structure of society, especially the power structure, at the
moment of the political selection. 
The nature and possible consequences of the political response to the out-
side pressure to adopt the external cultures would be affected by the charac-
ter of the structure of distribution of resources, particularly power, and the
degree to which such structural arrangements could be adjusted and/or
altered if necessary. Essentially, the adaptive capacity of the society is at
stake. In other words, in a society where the distribution of resources is rela-
tively equitable or at least the extent of concentration of resources is reason-
ably low, the general attitude of the power elite or those in the decision-
making group(s) or strata is relatively open to listen to the demands and
grievances of the rest of the population, and as a consequence, the society is
relatively well prepared to resolve any major social conflicts and to be open
to change if needed, it would be more feasible for the society to make neces-
sary adaptation in the face of the pressure of international acculturation. In
short, the degree of flexibility would make a great deal of difference in
adaptive effort. This we may call the Principle of Structural Flexibility, as a
sub-principle of political selectivity.
The Principle of Cultural Selectivity
When something like adaptive response to the pressure of international
acculturation is made, even though the decision is essentially made by the
political actors in the political context of the society, they have to draw upon
cultural resources available in the society for the selective response they
have to make. Culture, in short, supplies the guideline for the adaptive
response. As a matter of fact, in the process of adaptation to international
acculturation, what really counts is culture, not politics as such. Politics
operates merely as a medium to reflect cultural selection. In a sense, there-
fore, it is culture that makes the selection behind and beneath the political
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selection. This then is the essence of the Principle of Cultural Selectivity. 
To further elaborate this principle, though, we need to introduce a few
additional sub-principles. To begin with, one could argue that a culture
which is flexible enough to be open to the challenge from outside and to be
relatively open-minded in adopting new elements from outside would be
more likely to adapt to the new environment with less trouble than a society
with rigid and closed-minded culture. Here we are essentially dealing with
the cultural side of structural flexibility, and hence we might name this idea
as the Principle of Cultural Flexibility. 
No matter how flexible the substance and nature of culture may be, it still
would be useful to look into the extent of preparedness on the part of the
existing culture to accept foreign cultures. Being prepared implies not mere-
ly being open and ready to accept, but also being in a state of having accu-
mulated certain kinds of culture and acquired the capacity which would
enable the existing culture to understand, select if needed, and absorb what-
ever is deemed acceptable and necessary. Thus, it is called the Principle of
Cultural Preparedness.
In adopting and absorbing certain kinds of foreign culture, a society’s cul-
ture must also be somehow in tune with the incoming one. If they clash and
find each other completely alien, it would be extremely difficult for the
existing culture to comprehend the foreign to begin with and hence to
accept and adopt them as part of theirs eventually. I would call this the
Principle of Cultural Affinity. 
The Dynamics of Adaptive Change 
In making adaptive change, various social forces would have to interact
to exert influence upon the process. The degree and nature of structural flex-
ibility would play a central role but we might want to examine the features
of social dynamics involved more carefully and systematically. Basically,
this dynamics may also be characterized as dialectical interaction, as is the
case of interaction between societies exposed to each other in the global
process of modernization. In short, we could detect double dialectic.
First thing we need to assess is the nature of the system of social stratifica-
tion and the structure of class formation. This is particularly relevant to the
analysis of the selective processes mentioned above, where such structural
characteristics will be reflected in the dynamics of interaction by various
forces in society equipped with varying amounts of power and resources
and with variable interests, cultural vistas and value orientations. 
One aspect of this dynamics one might want to focus on is the interaction
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between the elite in power and the mass, and the possible part played by
the social forces that lie between those two, namely, the lesser elite largely
out of power, the intellectuals, and major actors in the economic sector.
These forces may in general try to represent their own class interest but also
may act as intermediaries between them, sometimes siding with either one
of them depending upon the circumstances. 
Secondly, parallel to this, the ideological orientations of the society may
be scrutinized. Ideology here mainly refers to the system of ideas in the
political and religious spheres developed and held by those various forces,
affecting the social and cultural life of the people. The relative influence of
these ideas would be determined by the relative power of those social forces
vis-a-vis other forces. In other words, we notice that political and cultural
selectivity is at work in this dynamics. 
In the process of adaptive change, then, there could be conflicts among
these forces over the issues of opening or closing door to the outside world,
accepting or rejecting foreign cultures, and selecting those elements to be
absorbed or repelled, and the like, according to their divergent interests and
ideological orientations. And depending upon the relative power of the
groups or forces, the consequences would vary. 
In the process of global modernization of the previous centuries, we have
observed that some societies somehow maintained their national sovereign-
ty to a significant degree, others remained autonomous politically but suc-
cumbed to the Western imperialists economically, and still others completed
colonized. These consequences depended largely on the nature of the struc-
ture of society and the dynamics of adaptive change mentioned above. 
The Meaning of Modernity
One final point is in order. When we view modernization from the per-
spective of the late modernizers, as illustrated above, the end result of the
process would then be modernity. As has been mentioned in the beginning,
many hold the view that modernity is something uniquely western in the
very sense that modernization was initiated by the western societies histori-
cally, and all other societies adopted it as their model. They further show
that there is something essentially modern about the whole social and cul-
tural configurations in terms of several characteristic social, political, eco-
nomic, and cultural patterns. 
To the new alternative view of modernization, modernity is not some-
thing already fixed but a dynamically emergent phenomenon. Each late
modernizing society, having to go through the complex process of adaptive
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change and indigenization, would come up with its own version of moder-
nity which can or cannot be identical to the original version of modernity
developed in the West in its process of modernization. The substance of
such modernity in the non-western world, therefore, is essentially a form of
mixture of the old traditional, the new foreign, and the emergent alternative
elements of culture. 
At this point, one should note that, since modernization has entailed
asymmetrical international acculturation where the western influence has
been preponderant, it is almost inevitable for modernity of any non-western
late-comer society to resemble, at least in form if not in substance, that of
western modernity to some extent. It would, therefore, be easy to mistake
modernity of a late-comer society for an exact replica of that of the West.
The fact is that, while the late-comers have learned and emulated the west-
ern version of modernity in the process of adaptive change, indigenized
versions are of necessity different from what they learned from the West. To
examine the nature and characteristics of modernity in these societies, there-
fore, requires very careful scrutiny lest this point may be missed. 
KOREAN MODERNIZATION: A COMPARATIVE ILLUSTRATION 
We are now ready to take a quick look at the nature of modernization
experienced by Korean society in the past century or so as an illustrative
case of a late modernizer, basically with the theoretical framework present-
ed above as the guiding ideas, not necessarily repeating those ideas in the
exposition. In order to provide a comparative purview, it may be useful to
approach this task in the context of East Asian modernization. I should
make it clear at this point that my synopsis of the historical unfoldings of
this region is necessarily very cursory and I shall not be able to do any
extensive review of the literature in this particular field, because, first, sim-
ply I am not a historian by training, second, it would take much more space
even to go over the historical facts in some detail than this paper could
assume, and third, this piece of work is intended primarily for theoretical
expositions to help understand the nature and special feature of Korean
modernization.3
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The Incipient Modernization under Duress
Opinions can vary among historians on the exact period, if not dates, of
Korea’s very first exposure to western cultures. Although China had already
established some contact with the West in the thirteenth century, the tide of
modernization reached East Asia in the 1500s, and the first Europeans to
arrive in China first and then in Japan were Portuguese Jesuits and traders,
followed by the Spaniards, the Dutch, the British and the French who later
even crossed the borders from China to venture into Korea. In the case of
Korea, records indicate that a Confucian scholar of what is known as the
Practical Learning School which challenged the orthodox Neo-
Confucianism adopted by the ruling elite brought home some documents
and gadgets of western origin from China around the turn of the 15th centu-
ry. This would have to be considered as an ad hoc kind of contact rather than
a significant case of international acculturation as we understand here.
Korea up till the very end of the 19th century used to be depicted by for-
eign visitors as a typical ‘Hermit Nation.’ In fact, seclusion, challenge and
response may most appropriately represent the salient features of the initial
modernization of all three nations of East Asia, but especially Korea. This
policy of seclusion was adopted when each of them established a strong
centralized dynasty, the Ming (1368-1644) in China, the Choson (1392-1910)
in Korea and the Tokugawa regime (1600-1867) in Japan. Doubtless to say,
despite such high and stiff wall of isolation, many items of western culture
had been incessantly seeped into these societies over the centuries. And yet,
the almost insurmountable pressure, military and diplomatic, was mount-
ing in earnest to tear down this wall of exclusion in the 19th century. 
The political and cultural responses from the three countries of course
varied, but in essence, the consequence of the incipient effort to meet the
challenge of international acculturation of the western modernization was a
successful modernization in Japan symbolized in the form of the Meiji
Restoration, but the demise of the Ch’ing Dynasty (1644-1912) in China and
the collapse of the Choson in Korea. In the case of Korea, though, there was
a slight twist in the process. It was not a birth of a republic like in China or a
modernized empire like in Japan. Rather, Korea came to be colonized by the
newly modernized imperial Japan, not by a western power of those days. 
Simply put, the internal dynamics of power struggle and the consequent
political-cultural selectivity and preparedness of the three nations largely
determined the nature of responses and their end-results in this process of
incipient modernization. In the case of Korea, this internal dynamics mainly
involved the power struggle between the ruling elite armed with the almost
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defunct orthodox Neo-Confucian ideology and statecraft, with an exclusive
monopoly over the resources of the society, and the rest of the social forces.
These dissenting forces consisted of the reform-minded elite out of power,
influenced by the foreign ideas and cultures as well as the Practical
Learning school of Confucianism, intellectuals known as the Eastern
Learning School intent on maintaining the traditional elements of culture
and yet defying the existing order with strong support from the peasantry,
and the broad commoner class utterly dissatisfied by the exploitation and
oppression of the corrupt and inept ruling elite. 
In the process of severe conflict between these social forces, the ruling
elite unable to contain the disorder was forced to solicit a helping hand from
the neighboring empires of China, Japan, and even Russia. And the final
winner of the game to gain control over the Korean peninsula came to be
the Japanese empire. Since the early part of the first decade of the 1900s and
1910 officially, Korean modernization had been carried out strictly under the
auspices of Japanese colonial authorities rather than by the autonomous ini-
tiative of the Korean people or society, up until liberation in 1945. 
In this connection, I should stress at least the following: 1) it was a mod-
ernization lacking autonomy of the Korean people, especially in terms of
political selectivity; 2) even cultural selectivity was restricted to the extent
that Japan deliberately attempted very hard to completely annihilate the
legacy of traditional elements of Korean culture, in vain of course; 3)
international acculturation entailed a double filtering process in the sense
that western cultures were introduced but only through some filtering by
the Japanese side of politico-cultural selectivity; 4) the nature of adaptive
change was such that Korea had to absorb western cultures already touched
and selected by Japanese culture, genuine Japanese cultures of both contem-
porary and traditional origins, and then place them in juxtaposition with the
existing Korean traditions in the face of tenacious resistance from some tra-
ditional elements; and 5) the end result of the process, the Korean version
modernity during the colonial days, therefore, was a cultural mixture of the
traditional, the Japanese which in itself was a mixture of the original
Japanese and Western, and the more or less genuine western cultures. 
In terms of substance of such modernity, Japan built in Korea certain
material and institutional infrastructures necessary for the colonial rule and
introduced new ways of life to push for a Japanese style of modernization in
Korea. The Japanese also tried to indoctrinate the Korean people to make
them true Japanese, culturally, mentally, spiritually, and so forth. In essence,
the Japanese colonial legacies have kept affecting social life of the Korean
people even after liberation in many respects, some in more subtle ways
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than others. One outstanding example of such cultural mixtures is the
authoritarian principle of social organization which may have its root in the
traditional Confucian heritage to some degree but has been reinforced and
somewhat distorted by the militaristic-autocratic-bureaucratic colonial rule
of the Japanese.
The Uncertain Modernization of the Post-Liberation Period
Upon liberation from the shackles of Japanese colonial rule, Korea faced
an enormous misfortune of national division forced upon it by the two pow-
ers of the Cold War era, the United States and the Soviet Union, each occu-
pying the South and North of the peninsula, respectively, originally with the
intention of disarming the Japanese army and preparing for nation-building
for the independent Korea. It was under such uncertain circumstances that
Korea now embarked on the project of modernizing the nation. And the his-
torical consequence of such conditions is what we see now in the peninsula,
vastly divergent paths trodden by the two sides of the nation in their pur-
suit of modernization.4
To begin with, the source of international acculturation was different.
Korea, for the first time in the history, came to be exposed directly to the
West, without any intervention or filtering of a third party country, but the
two parts of the nation to entirely different cultures of the USA and the
USSR. Wittingly or not, these two post-WWII powers occupying the two
sides of the peninsula brought with them divergent cultures to be trans-
planted in the Korean society. America with its liberal democracy, capitalist
market economy, and other attendant cultural ingredients slowly embarked
upon the task of nation-building on behalf of the Korean people in the
South, whereas Russians immediately installed a Soviet-type regime in the
North and pushed this new communist regime to swiftly undertake socialist
reforms. 
Another crucial difference manifested in this tide of acculturation that
had a great deal to do with the divergent modes of adaptive change in the
two parts was the degree of openness to the outside world, on the one hand,
and the nature of control over the people placed by the new regimes, on the
other. North Korea was immediately put under very strict control of the
Soviet-type totalitarian system which at once closed the door toward out-
side except for the communist bloc. This in a sense gave North Korea a
chance to maintain a high degree of internal socio-political stability with lit-
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tle conflict and cultural integration with little dissent. In the South, open-
ness and relative liberty meant proliferation of political groups with diverse
ideological platforms vying for power leading to often violent social con-
flicts and severe cultural confusion. This sheer anomie in the South, one
could even say, may have been a factor contributing to the decision made by
the North to wage the war of ‘national liberation’ by invading the South in
1950. 
As for the adaptive efforts on the part of the Korean people in the face of
such modes of acculturation, the basic feature may be termed ‘uncertainty.’
Liberation in itself came as a surprise, the nation was abruptly divided by
the outside forces, and the cultures imported or rather imposed upon them
were so strange that uncertainty reigned over them in terms of the direction
of their nation’s destiny. This uncertainty soon was to be quelled in the
North mainly because the adaptive change took the form of relatively sim-
ple emulation of the Soviet system with a policy of closure toward outside
and strict control inside. In the South, on the contrary, confusion ensued in
the early part of the post-liberation period and then stability settled in with
the installation of an independent state after the model of the American
republic in a very crude manner, though. 
The emergent modernity of this period between 1945 and 1950, therefore,
could be characterized as follows: 1) in the South, a rather confusing fusion
of the dynastic legacies, Japanese colonial influences, American political and
cultural impacts, and the resulting adaptive indigenization by the Korean
people was in the formation; 2) in the North, a Soviet-style system was
implanted in the society with still lingering dynastic heritages, Japanese
legacies, and the Korean efforts at adaptive indigenization. Details of the
contents of such forms of modernity will have to be spared for the sake of
space saving. 
Then, the Korean War (1950-53) dealt a devastating blow on the initial
adaptive changes by the both parts of Korea. On both sides, dependence
upon the patron nations of each deepened in the aftermaths of the war, but
rehabilitation seemed much more effective in the North with its highly
mobilizational mechanisms of a planned economy, while the basically free-
market pursuit of interest motivating the political economy of the South left
its effort to recover still wandering about pretty much in the dark. South
Korea had to wait until the early sixties not only for deliberate effort to
recover economically but also to undertake self-propelled modernization.
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The Indigenous Modernization since the 1960s
The early 1960s saw both South and North Korea embarking on the task
of modernization on their own initiative, very interestingly with different
justifications. 
North Korea made quite remarkable strides in economic growth under
the banner of self-reliance. This was done by a very deliberate and methodi-
cal political maneuvering on the part of Kim Il-Sung, the political leader of
North Korea. In the wake of the Korean War, he undertook two important
political tasks, to mobilize the populace to rehabilitate the almost complete-
ly destroyed economy and to consolidate his own political power through a
series of purges of his political foes. For the sake of the economic recovery,
he initially had to rely heavily on both the Soviet Union and communist
China. Towards the end of the 1950s, however, North Korea was forced into
a position to have to diplomatically distance itself from both of them which
came to be entangled in an ideological squabble owing to the detente policy
adopted by the Soviets after the death of Stalin. This move in turn caused
significant reduction in the economic aid from both. Thus, self-reliance
became an inevitable choice for Kim’s North Korea. It was under such cir-
cumstances he came out with the so-called Juche ideology of Self-Reliance.
This self-reliance ideology served not only the purpose of national inte-
gration needed to pursue rapid economic recovery and growth but also pro-
vided the ideational justification for Kim’s unique personality cult which
virtually became a civil religion in North Korea. However. adoption of this
self-reliance posture which meant to a very large extent almost complete
isolation from the outside world became the major cause of the economic
demise North Korea came to face in the following decades even way into
the 21st century. Indoctrination, mobilization, and control have been the cen-
tral mechanisms of maintaining the system intact with the accompanying
stagnation in economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres of life.
In the case of South Korea, the struggle for indigenous modernization was
ignited by the student upheaval of April 19, 1960, which toppled the Rhee
Syng Man regime of the First Republic in the South. The divided and inept
Second Republic created after the fall of Rhee was unable to sustain itself in
the face of severe socio-political disorder and economic failures, and eventu-
ally terminated in 1961 by the coup d’etat of General Pak Chung Hee. It was
Pak who now in the helm started a very deliberately conceived project of
‘Modernization of the Nation.’ It is really important to note that the term
‘modernization’ was clearly adopted by this new military regime, and in
fact, it became a central catchphrase for the entire nation in the following
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decades. In South Korea, the generation or social forces who led the task of
the “Miracle of the Han River’ or the remarkable rapid economic growth in
the period of the 1960s through the 1980s are often referred to as the ‘gener-
ation or forces of modernization.’ And the central elements of this genera-
tion happened to be technocrats in the state and corporate sectors and pro-
fessionals and functional intellectuals who rendered support to them.
In this sense alone, one could call this effort by the Pak regime as the very
first attempt by the Korean nation to embark on an indigenous program of
modernization, self-conceived and self-propelled by the Koreans themselves
without any intervention from outside forces or any uncertainty within the
society. International conditions were favorable for this endeavor and the
Korean people made the most out of this circumstance by learning, emulat-
ing, adopting, and absorbing whatever necessary items, material and cultur-
al, from the international acculturation process they were exposed to. The
main source of acculturation, no doubt, was the United States and Japan,
and to a much lesser extent some select European countries. In fact, the core
forces of technocrats and professionals had their education and training
largely in these countries.5
Juxtaposed with this generation of modernization is the ‘generation or
social forces of democratization.’ This reflects a very significant clash of val-
ues in Korean society between ‘the economy first’ and the ‘supremacy of
democracy’ in the Koran modernization of the period. As the push for rapid
economic achievement by the military regimes left almost all other sectors
of society under relatively tight control, during the decades of the 1960s
through the 1980s, democratization in the political arena as a potentially
central program of modernization was arrested, and the flourishing of civil
society at large exceedingly lagged. The apparent imbalance between the
unprecedented economic prosperity and the unfulfilled desire for equally
noticeable amount of societal liberalization and political democratization
has exacerbated the sense of frustration and deprivation among the people. 
Inheriting the tradition of protest originated in the April 19 student
upheaval, college students came to pose as the vanguard of democratization
movements, later supported and/or joined by activist intellectuals, religious
figures, labor leaders, and activist women’s groups. Open conflicts
inevitably flared up and the regime responded with severe oppression and
cooptation rather than peaceful resolution of conflicts, and a vicious circle of
more violent resistance from the dissenting forces met by more repressive
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ground of the elite in South Korea. For this argument, see Kim and Lee (2003).
responses from the regime and so on ensued. This process culminated in a
massive civil rebellion which eventually led the authoritarian regime to suc-
cumb to the demand by the people to liberalize civil society and democra-
tize politics. Free elections were held to make a peaceful regime change a
reality, marking the end of authoritarian militaristic rule started in the 1961
coup by General Pak Chung Hee. 
The subsequent civilian regimes led by two erstwhile democracy move-
ment leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, embarked on ambitious
reforms in the political and economic spheres without much success. In
their regimes, many from the democracy movement now stepped into the
government posts in the main decision-making circles, and they were the
zealots who were intent on reforming the apparently anciens regimes inherit-
ed from the authoritarian period. Despite their effort, they have been
engulfed in corruption scandals involving their own clique members and
eventually faced the financial crisis causing the drastic measure of bailout
by the International Monetary Fund(IMF) which required an overhaul of the
corporate and financial institutions in the late 1990s. 
The very first new regime of the 21st century which came to power
through the election of President Roh Moo Hyun in 2002 now is going
through a very difficult period of establishing itself as an effective govern-
ment. The main social force which put him in power and then joined him in
the new regime happens to be the relatively younger generation maverick
politicians and intellectuals who had fought for democracy in the 1970s and
1980s but had no political or bureaucratic career background. They are natu-
rally very anxious to reform many aspects of social institutions as quickly as
possible, but the main sources of their difficulties lie in their apparent ama-
teurism and rather adamant resistance from the so-called generation of
modernization with vested interest in the existing system. And South Korea
is now facing a formidable task of making the system work for political sta-
bilization, societal integration, and sustained economic growth, which are
the main engines for Korea’s effort to join the rank of advanced nations in
the global stage in the coming decade or so. 
I cannot spend any more space beyond this very cursory account of the
broad picture of the experience of modernization in Korea. Instead, as a way
of characterizing the essential features of Korean modernization, it may be
useful to go over the nature of modernity created by such a process of mod-
ernization as summarized above. 
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MODERNITY KOREAN STYLE
Earlier, I have suggested that modernity means a form of cultural mixture
resulting from the experience of modernization in each society. It still retains
some traditional elements of the culture to begin with, it then adds the for-
eign cultures transmitted through international acculturation, and in the
dynamic process of interaction of these elements are formed newly emerg-
ing cultural mixtures. In this sense, modernity in each society takes on some
unique features with certain differences as well as similarities compared
with other cases of modernity. This may be said to represent the general pic-
ture of modernity in any society, including the West. For the late-moderniz-
ers, however, the mixture is rather complex and it cannot be an exact replica
of the western version of modernity as emerged and developed in the West.
Since the space limitation does not allow me to detail the substance of
modernity found in Korea, let me selectively touch upon only the most sig-
nificant aspects of Korean modernity as emerged and shaped in the process
of modernization, mainly in the political economy and some select aspects
of the socio-cultural liferworld. 
South Korea, as it stands at the turn of the 21st century, looks very much
like any democratic capitalist society in its modernity in the sphere of the
political economy. The Constitution clearly espouses a republican govern-
ment with the sovereignty bestowed on the people, all the ingredients of
basic human rights stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
firmly installed, and the state constituted with three branches of govern-
ment separately institutionalized. Representatives of the people are now
elected regularly by the direct ballots of the electorate, both on the national
and local levels. The press has established itself as a powerful means of
expression of opinions and various organizations representing different
interest groups and voluntary civic associations flourish. The general popu-
lace always can express their demands and grievances in any form provided
in the law, including mass protest rallies. 
In the private sector, business is run by incorporated corporations and
firms of various scales. They compete in the open market under the rules of
game promulgated in the legal codes according to which they are to serve
the interest of both shareholders and consumers, advertising freely by
means of diverse media available. The state provides rules to help the pri-
vate sector to operate as smoothly as possible, with regulations and controls
exercised only when necessary. Legal provisions allow all the stakeholders
such as workers, shareholders, and consumers, to express their demands
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and grievances, sometimes in mass action like strikes and boycotts, if neces-
sary. 
So far so good in the sense that this picture presents a nice rationalized
modern democratic polity and a capitalist economy pretty much in the form
of what you see in the modern democratic capitalism of the West as if they
are its replica. The same logic applies to other sectors of society. The press
equipped with all the up-to-date technological gadgets enjoys an enormous
degree of freedom of expression and often wields great amount of power in
forming public opinion. Civil society has become quite activated and vari-
ous types of voluntary civil organizations proliferate. Various social institu-
tions are set up in accordance with the western modern rational form. 
This surface look, however, should not mislead one to believe that Korean
modernity, therefore, is a western type resulted from the general process of
modernization. The real picture is much more complicated. True, the politi-
cal economic system and other social institutions were adopted after the
western model, but in the process of modernization, adaptive change was
made and indigenization ensued. This is no place to present a detailed pic-
ture of this complicated form of cultural mixture and it should suffice to
briefly review the traditional elements and other mixtures created in the
indigenization process.
Traditional Elements
Perhaps, one of the most outstanding and relatively unique features of
traditional nature in the Korean political economy is the patrimonial system
of organization and governance.6 In today’s political economy, under the
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6 It would be impossible to describe in detail what patrimonialism stands for, but in essence, it
is a form of patriarchal familism transplanted into the political and economic system and culture.
The ruler is the patriarch, he virtually owns the state itself, the whole property and the entire
populace of the country. Members are obligated to obey the ruler almost absolutely, who then in
turn is expected to look after the subjects like the father does in the family. All the subjects are
forced to compete for the mercy and special favors of the king, by showing unswerving loyalty to
the ruler. For this kind of rule, the ruler builds and relies heavily upon a patrimonial bureaucracy
manned with the intellectual elite of the society. In the case of Korea, especially during the last
dynastic era of the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910), this elite consisted of the gentry class who
enjoyed the privileged status of moral-intellectual elite on the basis of their harsh training in
Confucian classics, which provided them with the ground to monopolize the source of authority
and legitimacy in state affairs and maintaining social order. Under the patrimonial politico-eco-
nomic system, the peasantry was severely taxed by the state and exploited by the bureaucratic
gentry which did not have to dirty their hands. Mining industry was under strict state control
and even handicraft and commerce were not entirely free from the hand of the state. For discus-
sion of patrimonial political culture and system in general, see Weber(1951), and for its applica-
tion to the case of Korean modernization, refer to Jacobs(1985) and Kim and Lee(2003).
surface of apparent democratic capitalism, the supreme political and busi-
ness leaders such as the President of the Republic, party bosses, and even
corporate CEOs in the private sector are virtually patrimonial rulers in that
they wield power, act, and expect to be treated just like the king of the pre-
modern dynasty. And one could easily find crossovers of this pattern into
other institutional sectors, as well. 
The prevalent principles of social organization still effective in Korean
society are deeply rooted in the traditional elements of hierarchical authori-
tarianism, collectivism with a special emphasis on familism, connectionism
based on blood relations, locality of origin, attended schools, and other
career cohort, personalism stressing emotional involvement and attachment
in social relations, and the like. These orientations in combination may have
yielded such practices as nepotism, favoritism, cronyism, and the like,
which in turn may have contributed to widespread irregularities in business
and corruption in public service. In fact, when the financial crisis hit the
Korean economy in the late 1990s, many observers outside Korea came to
blame these traditional elements as the major factors hindering rationaliza-
tion of the system. Value orientations placing importance on the respect for
authority, especially that of the state and the patriarchal head of organiza-
tions, learning and education, discipline and self-control, hard work, and so
on, which are often attributed to Confucian teachings, may be affecting the
behavior of the Korean people in general even today. 
Colonial Legacies
While Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) did play the role of modernizer
for Korea whose initiative was nil under the circumstances, one could say
that the nature of the political economy was basically a mixture of colonial,
dependent, and exploitive capitalism under a severely repressive rule of
Japanese style autocratic-militaristic-bureaucratic-authoritarianism. In addi-
tion, for the purpose of effective colonial rule, maintenance of some of the
traditional elements of Korea was not entirely undesirable. Japan also intro-
duced a variety of social forms and cultural items from the West in the form
of Japanized modernity. Thus, the early mode of modernity created by this
passive modernization on the part of Korea already was a cultural mixture
of traditional elements, colonial policies, and the western patterns filtered
through Japanese adoption and indigenization. 
Indigenization Effort
It was only after liberation that Korea was placed in a position to deter-
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mine her own mode of modernization. Initially, however, Korea, an unwit-
tingly and forcefully divided nation, was a rather passive modernizer
swamped with the surging tide of tilted acculturation almost imposed upon
her culture by the occupation forces, the Americans in the South and the
Russians in the North. Korea, therefore, had to pass through a phase of
relentless adoption and adaptation in the early days of independence and
through the war years of the 1950s. 
The early 1960s now began to see the earnest emergence within the soci-
ety of autonomous attempt at indigenous definition of modernization as a
national program in terms of the planned economic development. In this
connection, we see interesting cases of self-made ideological platforms, for
example, in the name of “Guided Capitalism” and “the Korean style democ-
racy.” These platforms essentially implied that while the private sector
would take care of the chore of production and distribution pretty much in
accordance with the market rules, the state would make the most important
decisions and virtually ‘guide’ the economy as the patrimonial ruler. This,
therefore, entailed the need for a unique form of governance not necessarily
democratic in spirit but in letter only. 
In the formation of modernity in this fashion, one could easily detect a
very complicated mixture of cultural items taken from the traditional ele-
ments, colonial legacies, western patterns, and indigenous adaptation. I can-
not detail the substance of such examples here, but you may have no diffi-
culty at all in locating some form of such cultural mixtures in all other insti-
tutional sectors of Korean society. Naturally, depending on the sector, differ-
ent cultural elements from different sources would be combined in the
process of indigenization. In this connection, the logic is relatively simple
that modernity in contemporary Korea is indeed a complex mixture of these
cultural elements, and the same logic could readily be extended to other
societies with similar modernization experiences. 
What interests me at this final juncture is the issue of ‘rationalization’ in
Weberian sense. How relevant is Weberian rationality to, say, Korean
modernity? 
The Issues of Rationality and Rationalization 
With or without Weber, we know that modernization in the West has
meant “the increasing rationalization” of life (Weber, 1970; Hall et al., 1996:
171ff). The main ingredients of this process contained the rise of science and
technology, the growth of capitalism as a “rational” form of economic life
and system, and the development of a political culture rooted in legal-ratio-
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nal laws, rules, and procedures. In the realms of more ideational or spiritual
aspects of culture, it represented what Weber referred to as “de-magification
or the disenchantment of the world,” which also entailed secularization of
culture. 
When we apply this reasoning to the case of non-western modernization,
once again we encounter a mixture of rationalization in some respects and
changes that have little to do with rationality. Thus, the resulting nature of
modernity takes on a mixed picture of rationality and things that are either
irrelevant or often counter to rationality. In short, modernization is not a lin-
ear change yielding a convergent outcome in all societies. 
Let us briefly touch upon some of the outstanding features of this mixing
process in Korean modernization. To begin with, the science and technology
component is definitely there and in some areas, Korean business has been
rather successful in catching up with western technologies. But the socio-
cultural atmosphere surrounding scientific activities and technological
advances, principles of relevant organization, and modus operandi of the
whole business and politics of science and technology are complex reflec-
tions of the traditional elements, colonial legacies, and some unique adapta-
tion of the western forms. 
The capitalist form of economy with its management know-how and
bureaucratic organizations and the democratic political institutions with all
their legal, procedural, and behavioral goodies have been fairly well adopt-
ed, and yet their contamination by traditional, colonial, and other peculiari-
ties of the reality of indigenization efforts is undeniable. Owing to the intro-
duction of mass culture cum the technological niceties, much of culture in
the arts areas resemble those of the West,but the substance that such items
carry are unique and different. In the religious sphere, Christianity is con-
sidered a western religion (which it is not), and the outward looks of organi-
zation, ritual, and scriptures all are look-alikes of any western Christianity.
A deep peep into the inside of those churches, messages, and practices
would soon reveal that a peculiar form of secularization of religion Korean
style, hard to be copied elsewhere, has been created in the process of mixing
of various elements involved. The same goes even for other traditional reli-
gions which have gone through their own versions of secularization with all
the mixtures of modernization. 
While rationalization has been achieved in the more mundane and techni-
cal spheres of socio-economic life, those non-rational, irrational, and even
anti-rational elements of culture have tenaciously intermingled with the
rational, in the process of modernization, in the non- western world.
Therefore, one could say that if the post-modernist movements in various
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areas of social, cultural, and intellectual endeavors in the West is to over-
come some of the negative effects of over-rationalization of life in the mod-
ernization process, further rationalization in some areas of socio-political
and cultural-intellectual life still is an important task of modernization in
the late-comer societies, like Korea. This is especially true in view of the
extensive globalization that is underway. Not that rationality and rational-
ization are the requisites of any modernization in any society, but that sur-
vival in the ever more competitive world market dominated by the early
modernizer world capitalist centers requires such elements for even the late
modernizer nations. In this sense, globalization is an extension of modern-
ization, unlike the view espoused by some that globalization finally is
replacing modernization(Dirlik, 1999). 
IN CLOSING
Now, in this closing part, a few words may be in order about the idea of
‘response’ in laying out my theoretical views on alternative modernization
and modernity. Earlier, Toynbee already suggested the notion of challenge
and response in the rise of fall of civilizations, and some historians of East
Asia, such as Beers, Clyde, Fairbank, and Reischauer have also employed
the framework of challenge and response experienced by societies of this
region in their modernization process. As a matter of fact, not merely in the
case of late comers but also the initial modernization of the West was a
response to the challenge encountered by the West through its cultural con-
tact with the East. And as Lenski and Lenski(1987) have aptly put it, the
West prior to modernization remained as a ‘backwater’ of civilizations, rela-
tive to the then advanced Eastern civilizations. What is special about the
western modernization may be that it spread out in a global scale and has
affected every existing society all over the world. 
At this juncture, however, one should be reminded that classical thoughts
of ancient East Asia are rich with the idea of challenge and response not
only in the human social arenas but also in the cosmological order.
Particularly significant in this connection is the Yin-Yang dialectics.
Although I have dealt with this in earlier works(Kim, 1991), this is no place
to go into a fuller discussion of the meaning of Yin-Yang dialectics and its
implications for the theoretical understanding of the dynamics of modern-
ization. At any rate, it would be useful to view the dynamic interaction
among nations in the process of modernization as a form of dialectical
encounter of Yin and Yang forces, one positive and the other negative in
nature and yet affecting each other in a very delicate manner. This kind of
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discourse would not only provide a theoretic view of alternative moderniza-
tion and modernity, but also it in itself could be an alternative theoretical
framework to explain the dynamics of the process of alternative moderniza-
tion as well as the emergence of alternative modernities as a consequence. 
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